THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL AGAINST THE PLAUSIBILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

by Shamnika Rupasinghe

In the barren desert a small girl stands outside her straw house. She stares inside at her brother who has died of starvation. But she does not cry, for she has seen it happen before. She has seen so many die of starvation and deadly diseases in her village. She has seen her father and mother deteriorate. She is all alone. There is no one to turn to, and she knows that tomorrow she may meet the same fate.

It is obvious that evil exists.  Evil is not an illusion. Those who claim this are merely trying to escape the reality of this fallen world. The fact of evil causes many to disbelieve in an all-poweful, all-good and all-knowing God. For if such a God exists,  surely He could have created a world without such intense and apparently pointless evil. 

The argument from evil strikes at the heart of theism. For only theists boast of such a God. But theists believe that because of God's attributes He will one day destroy evil. So, for the theist the question really is, "Why has not God wiped out evil (in all its abundance, kinds, and distribution) already?" We will look at the atheistic position, presuppositions behind the argument from evil, the theistic responses and a possible reason for the existence of evil. (NB: in this article, "God" always refers to the theistic God)

Backgrounder:
The Nature of Arguments

Arguments are like weapons; they are designed to hit a target. Indeed, a strong argument can hit its target every time. But like any weapon, an argument must be carefully studied for complete mastery. Thus before we look at the atheistic argument from evil and its refutation, we must look at what arguments are and the ways they may be used.

Arguments are made out of a logical order of propositions. There are two types of propositions in an argument, "premise" and "conclusion". Premises attempt to provide reasons for accepting the conclusion. Let us look at how these two are placed in a sample argument.

1. All humans have bones

2. Socrates is a human

3. Therefore, Socrates has bones. 

The premises of this argument are 1 and 2. The conclusion, as indicated by 'therefore', is 3.

These terms are easy to grasp, but one that is not so easy is validity. Often, when we use the word 'valid' we mean true. But this is not the correct meaning of the word as used in logic. Many people make valid arguments without an ounce of truth in them. The point is, validity and truth are distinct from each other. Validity refers to a relationship between premises and conclusion, while truth refers to a particular premise or conclusion. To see if the above argument is valid, we must see if the conclusion follows from the premises. The idea here is that a valid argument must have a true conclusion if the premises are true. Another way of saying this is that it is impossible to have true premises and a false conclusion. Note we are not saying that a valid argument must have true premises or a true conclusion. We are only saying that if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. Here is an example of a valid argument without any truth in it.

1. Mice are blood-thirsty beasts

2.  Socrates is a mouse

3. Socrates is a blood-thirsty beast

Here all the premises and conclusion are false. But if the premises were true, then the conclusion must be true. Because of this fact, the argument is valid.

The best type of argument is a sound one. This has nothing to do with how well you can shout your opponent down in a debate. Rather, soundness refers to truth and validity. A sound argument is valid and has true premises. This of course means that the conclusion is true.

But though the previous argument is valid it still cannot show the conclusion to be true. This is because the premises are false. So we cannot use the premises to prove the conclusion. Note that even if only one premise were false we still could not show the conclusion to be true by the argument. Since we cannot make any judgments about the conclusion, the argument is useless. Remember this, for theists attack the argument from evil by showing it has a false premise. Because of this, the argument is unsound.  

An unsound argument, is basically an utterly useless argument because the conclusion does not have to be true. So we cannot use the argument to prove the conclusion. There are two ways an argument can be unsound. It can have a false premise (as the above argument), or it can be invalid.

The opposite of a valid argument is an invalid one. In an invalid argument, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. That is, if the premises are true, the conclusion does not have to be true. Take this argument for example.

1. Every All Black is a rugby player

2. My neighbour is a rugby player

3. Therefore, my neighbour is an All Black

If premises 1 and 2 were true, the conclusion does not have to be true. Note the conclusion may be true, but it does not have to be true. 

The Argument From Evil

Let us look at the general form of the argument from evil:

1. Evil exists

2. The existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient God

3. Therefore, such a God does not exist

This argument is valid. Therefore, if you accept the premises the conclusion must is true. 

There are four ways to counter the argument from evil. All objections show that there is nothing inconsistent between God's attributes and evil. In other words, they show that premise 2 is false (so the argument is unsound).

Answering the First Premise: evil exists
The first objection shows that the argument collapses because there is a contradiction between premise 1 and the conclusion. It touches on the presuppositions behind the argument from evil. For if an argument assumes in its premises what it denies in its final conclusion, [1] it is self- defeating. This is precisely what occurs in any argument from evil.

In attempting to press his claim about evil, by premise 1, the atheist has assumed an ultimate standard of good. For if there is no standard, how can the atheist insist that a certain act or situation is evil? This standard must be beyond this world, otherwise, who defines what good and evil is - Stalin, Mother Teresa, Hitler? Evil presupposes an objective standard of good by which it is judged truly evil.

But what is evil is privation; in this sense blindness means the privation of sight.[2]

When a man loses his sight, we know that it is an evil because he should have had sight to begin with. When we see a child in agony, we automatically know that it is an evil because the child should have been healthy.

Since we need to presuppose an ultimate standard of good with which to judge an act "evil", we arrive right back at God. For it is His nature which is the only possible standard.

Without God we are just a complex arrangement of molecules, which evolved by time, chance and natural selection. Both "evil" and "good" acts become ultimately one set of molecules colliding with another. To escape this conclusion there must be a divine creator making us much more than mere molecules.

This point was vividly illustrated in Nazi Germany. Hitler took atheism to its ultimate conclusion. For with no standards, other than those of his own making or the making of his group, an individual has no reason to do other than seek his own benefit. Why should we care about the handicapped and others in need? Hitler followed Nietzsche's and Darwin's ideas that we should allow the weak to die and allow the strong to breed.[3]  For example, Darwin, after complaining that keeping unhealthy people alive in hospitals and asylums must be detrimental to the human race, concludes:

We must, therefore, bear the undoubtedly bad effects of the weak surviving and propagating their kind.[4]

Some people argued that by allowing only the "fit" to breed, man would evolve into a race of supermen. For example, in Mein Kampf (i.e. My Struggle) Hitler quoted Nietzsche: "That which does not kill us makes us stronger."

Also, at the 1946 Nuremberg Trials, some of the Nazi defendants protested that there was no law higher than their country's by which to try them. By judging them, we implied that there was an absolute standard of good above any country's law.

Hence, the atheistic argument from evil is self-defeating. For premise 1 must presuppose the existence of God while the conclusion denies that God exists. The fact of evil does not destroy the idea of God but rather supports it. So the notion of an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God must be compatible with evil.

Thus, the theist does not need to defend God's attributes because the argument from evil does not attack them. Note that the theist has not shown the conclusion to be false (although he should be able to do so by using other arguments). All the theist has done is shown that the atheist can't use the argument from evil, because it is unsound, to prove that God does not exist. The theist has rendered the argument from evil useless to prove the atheist's conclusion. The atheist must use other arguments to try and disprove God (futile as they may be).

Answering the Second Premise: evil is incompatible with God
In the second objection, the atheist is asked, how do you know that evil is incompatible with God? After all, it's possible that God has a reason for allowing evil ?

Just as a doctor amputates a limb for a reason (often because it is diseased), it is possible that God has a reason for allowing evil in this world. Note that we use the words "it is possible". This touches on one misconception of the theist's objection.

This misconception is that the atheist might accept that there is an unknown reason or justifying good, but only if the theist can prove that a reason exists in the first place.[5] Another way of saying this is that the theist, using the second objection, is assuming that a reason exists. But he cannot just assume this. He must provide proof for his assumption. It follows that the ultimate onus of proof is on the theist.

This is a misunderstanding of the theist's response. The theist need not provide proof for the claim that there is a reason because this is not his claim. The theist, in responding to the argument from evil by objecting to premise 2, (ie. the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient God.) is not trying to prove that the conclusion is false (though it is obvious that the theist believes it is). The conclusion must be shown to be false by other arguments (eg, design, moral, historical, cosmological, etc.).[6]

The theist is arguing that premise 1 is false so the conclusion does not have be true. Because of this, the argument from evil cannot be used to prove that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God does not exist. In other words, the theist is arguing that the argument from evil is of no value because there is no inconsistency between God's attributes and evil. Proving that there is a reason is effectively asking whether God exists or not. That is a different question altogether.

So the theist is not claiming that a reason exists, but rather that a reason possibly exists. Since it is possible that God has a reason, premise 2 is false.

This reason must be connected with good. For:

Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.[7]

God would not allow evil to exist and corrupt His people without a justifying good. Of course, such good must outweigh the evil, and the evil must be necessary to achieve the good.[8]

Here we hit upon another misconception about the theist's objection. Some would say that claiming it is possible that God has a reason implies that God is not omnipotent. They argue that an omnipotent being could surely find a way to bring about this good without permitting evil.

However, it must be remembered that omnipotence means the power to do things which are logically possible. For example,  no power can make a logical contradiction, such as a square circle. 

So it is still possible that God has a reason (justifying good) for allowing this evil. For it may be logically impossible to achieve the good without the evil.

In response to the theist's claim (ie. it is possible God has a reason) atheists often say that this accounts only for some of the evil. Indeed, there are cases where outweighing good needs an evil (eg. heroism, sympathy, generosity). But the atheist will insist that there are some evil situations in which there is no reason.

"Do you see any point in a small child being stricken with disease; a sincere man, who has a family, suddenly dying in a car crash; or millions of innocent unborn babies being murdered in the abortion centres?" the atheist will ask the theist.

We will name such examples which the atheist uses as specific evils,[9] since the atheist specifies an evil by its kind, amount or distribution. So what he is arguing is this:

1. There are specific evils which are not necessary for achieving good, or the good could have been achieved without them.

2. An omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient God would prevent such specific evils.

3. Therefore, such a being does not exist.

This argument is valid. Hence, if the premises are accepted, the conclusion must be true.

But the point here is the atheist has still failed to prove his point. For it is still possible that God has a reason for allowing these specific evils. Therefore, premise 1 is false.

In addition, it needs to be said that the atheist has no way of explaining evil and nothing to offer those experiencing specific evils. The atheist's position is no more plausible than he alleges the theist's position to be. 

In order to support the claim, 'it is possible that God has a reason', theists have responded in many ways. 

One response is that God is so far above His creation and thus it is possible that there may be a reason which is not known. Hence, the theist need not give a reason or justifying good.

The atheist can also object by logical analogy and can argue that when a person allows an evil to happen which could have been prevented, such as leaving a child to drown,[10] we would blame that person even if he claims to have a good reason.

But such an analogy is incorrect because there is a category difference. That is, God is not the same as a human being. God is the creator and thus has the right to take the life He has created, while His creatures have the duty to preserve life. The creator also has the power to resurrect the dead (a fact overlooked by many atheists).

Many theists have stressed the limited knowledge of humans and conclude that it is possible that God has a reason which we would not understand.[11] Our ability to understand God's ways is less than a stone-age man's ability to understand why a doctor is not evil when he must amputate a gangrenous limb.

Some atheists attack this by claiming that since God is omnipotent, He would have infinite explaining power.[12] However, this is to misunderstand omnipotence. For it is logically impossible for God to explain his infinite ways to finite beings. There is no such thing as infinite explaining power because it takes two for the explanatory process. Just as a man without ears cannot hear sound, finite beings without infinite intelligence cannot understand infinitely complex reasons. They simply lack the necessary apparatus.

Another point is that even if God could explain the existence of evil to us, it does not mean He must do so. Can an atheist prove that the creator is morally obliged to justify Himself to His creatures?

There is another objection against the theist maintaining that there may be an unknown reason. A person holds a belief, and is presented with, what seems to be, a sound counter-argument against it. That person could always say there is some reason not to accept the argument which only God knows. In other words, by arguing that God only knows, not us, we will never be able to prove the absolute soundness of an argument.[13]

It must be remembered that we can completely disprove a belief by showing that it entails a logical contradiction. Hence, we will reach a decision by such an argument. But other beliefs do not involve logical assertions. In such cases 100% proof is difficult, but we can say the counter argument is sound beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, we have rational grounds for believing its truth.[14]

But can the atheist argue that we should accept the premise that there is pointless evil (premise 1) on rational grounds ? William Rowe is an atheist who uses such an argument.[15] He describes the suffering of a fawn burnt in a forest fire and asserts that it is not reasonable to believe that there is a reason/justifying good.

Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be a greater good such that the prevention of the fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn' s suffering that it would have had to occur had the fawn's suffering been prevented.[16] (emphasis in original).

He admits that the atheist is not omniscient and thus cannot know or prove that there is no reason. But in light of experience and knowledge the atheist can claim there is rational support to believe that there is no reason and hence that there is pointless evil.

But what constitutes rational support in this case? We do not have knowledge or experience in the field of omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence. Thus to speak of rational support beyond reasonable doubt in this case is absurd.

So far, the two theistic responses examined show that the theist is not under any obligation to give a reason or justifying good for specific evils.

Answering the Conclusion: therefore, God doesn't exist 
The third way of countering the argument from evil is by providing a possible reason. Note that again we use the word "possible". This is because theists when giving a reason cannot be sure it is the actual reason for God allowing evil, for God is infinitely great. He knows all, and so the only claim that can be made is that the reason given is a possible one.

The most famous possible reason is the "free will defence". That is, the free will of creatures may be a justifying good.

'Free will' means that a creature is "free with respect to an action."[17] Morally good actions must be done freely, otherwise they are not really moral actions at all. Rather, they are like the actions of a robot. However, if by definition, the creatures truly have free choice, they must also be free to choose evil. True love is impossible without the possibility of hatred. Programming a computer to flash 'I love you' on the screen is clearly not an example of love.

Specific evils are the major objections to the free will defence. One attack is that it is better not to have free will because it leads to so much suffering. But such an argument is subjective. There is no basis by which we can compare a world without freedom to a world with freedom.[18] Because of this, there are no objective grounds to test the hypothesis that a world without freedom is better than a world with it.

Another objection is that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God could have created a better world (without all this intense suffering) containing free creatures. There are many possible worlds. Surely God could have just actualised the one in which creatures freely choose good.

However, this argument is a misunderstanding of free will.[19] Free will is given to God's creatures. Hence, the creatures determine the possible world, not God. If any interference by God (eg. setting things up differently or creating us with dispositions) to make creatures freely choose good is a contradiction in terms. The efficient cause of evil lies with the moral decisions of creatures, not God.[20]

Some maintain that God could regularly intervene to make a better world.[21] But such intervention defeats the purpose of free will. Is a murderer really free to kill if every time he tries, God stops him? Many atheists do not realise how offensive theistic intervention would be to them. How would they like it if God intervened every time blasphemy was thought, uttered, or written.

Animal suffering is yet another objection. The objection is that free will does not explain why animals, which do not suffer make moral choices, suffer.

But it can be argued that animal suffering results from the free will of humans. That is, they are victims (even humans have been victims without making a wrong moral choice).

The theist can also claim that other forms of animal suffering exist for different reasons other than human free will. For example, it could be claimed that some animal suffering is necessary (eg. pain after touching fire) as a danger warning. So the theist does have possible reasons at his disposal which show that animal suffering is not as pointless as the atheist makes it out to be.

Many atheists claim that free will does only part of the job, for it fails to explain the physical evil which does not arise out of free will (eg. earthquakes). Of course, some physical evil results from human free will (eg. a careless man can blind himself)[22] but obviously others do not.

Plantinga uses the free will of Satan and other supernatural beings as a possible explanation for such evil. This could also be extended to animal suffering.

Many other reasons for physical evil can  also be given.[23] For example, it could be claimed that physical evil acts as a moral warning. It shows the consequences of sin on the human race. Another consequence of one person's privation is that it makes others more appreciative of their good fortune. Hellen Keller (who thanked God for her handicaps) wrote that it would be a blessing if everyone could be struck blind and deaf  for a day to make them appreciate the gifts of sight and hearing.

There is yet another theistic response which can be used. It can be used in isolation or with the other defences against the attacks based on specific evils levelled at the free will defence. The theist can argue that the actualisation of this world is the best way to ill achieve the best possible world.[24]

The final chapter of human existence is yet to be written, and the justifying good is in the next world. Evidence for an afterlife due to Christ's resurrection must be examined. It can be argued that evils (esp. specific ones) are necessary to teach man the consequences of rejecting God.

Positive Counter-Arguments

The final way to attack the argument from evil is to argue for the existence of c God. This counter attacks premise 2 indirectly. Let us see what the structure of this argument is:

1. An omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God exists

2. Such a God would prevent evil unless He had a reason

3. Therefore, evil is compatible with an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God

This argument is valid. So the theist who uses this line of defence must show that all the premises are true, for then the conclusion must be true.

It is obvious that premise 2 is true. So the theist must prove premise 1 to be true. Here, he must use other arguments to prove this. For example, he can argue from the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Alternately, he can argue that an intelligent designer is necessary to create the order in life we see, such as the tiny electric rotary motor of a bacterium's flagellum. There are many arguments the theist can use (eg. cosmological, ontological, teleological, moral, etc.).

We have seen that when faced with the argument from evil the theist has many replies. The theist can argue that the argument is self-defeating and consistency is kept by claiming there is a possible reason which is not known to us. Hence, the theist need not give any reason or justifying good for the existence of specific evils. However , the theist may wish to give a possible reason or a combination of reasons for the existence of specific evils.

The most famous is the "free will defence". The theist can also claim that the actualisation of this world is the best way to achieve the best possible world.

Other tools at the theist's disposal are the other arguments for God's existence.

The argument from evil may appear a problem at first glance. But on closer examination it really presents no problem at all. 

References

1. 'final conclusion' is used here to distinguish this definition of a self-defeating argument from a reductio ad absurdum type. Return to text

2. Aquinas, Thomas.  In Philosophical texts. Selected and translated with notes and an introduction by Thomas Gilby. (London: Oxford University, 1951), p.167. Return to text

3. Keith, Sir Arthur. Evolution and Ethics (New York: Putnam, 1947), passim. Keith, himself an atheistic evolutionist, wrote, "The German Fuehrer ...has consistently sought to make the practice of Germany conform to the theory of evolution" (p.230). Return to text

4. Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man, p.150. Return to text

5. O'Connor, David. "Theism, evil and the onus of proof- reply to F.J. Fitzpatrick".  Religious Studies 19 (1983): 241-47. Return to text

6. This is also a way of attacking the argument from evil as shown later. Return to text

7. Augustine. Enchiridion, XI. Return to text

8. Fitzpatrick, F J. "The onus of proof in arguments about the problem of evil". Religious Studies 17 (1981): 19-28. Return to text

9. Fitzpatrick, pp. 22-24. Return to text

10. Lugenbehl, Dale. "Can the argument from evil be decisive after all?" Religious Studies 18 (1982): 29-35. Return to text.

11. Fitzpatrick, p.25. Return to text

12. Lugenbehl, p.32. Return to text

13. Fitzpatrick, pp.28-30. Return to text

14. Rowe, William, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism".  American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (4) 1979. Return to text

15. Rowe. Return to text

16. Rowe. Return to text

17. Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom and Evil (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), p.29. Return to text

18. Geisler, Norman. The Philosophy of Religion (Michigan: Zondervan, 1974), pp.358-59. Return to text

19. Plantinga, pp.34-59. Return to text

20. Basinger, David. "Evil as evidence against God's existence: Some clarifications". The Modern Schoolman, March (1981). Return to text

21. Basinger. Return to text

22. Geisler, pp.380-403. Return to text

23. Geisler.  Return to text

24. Geisler, pp.361-70.  Return to text

2003 Wellington Christian Apologetics Society (Inc.) All Rights Reserved.

Previously published in
Apologia (The Journal of the Wellington Christian Apologetics Society)
vol. 2 no.2 (1993): 10-18

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